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No Safe Harbor 





There has been an increase in contingent employment arrangements 
in the United States for more than two decades. This increase has gen-
erated much discussion in the legal and human resource practitioner 
communities, as well as legislative activity and litigation, about how 
to apply federal and state laws governing these forms of employment. 
However, many of the key precedents used to apply the laws to contin-
gent employment arrangements have been established already through 
case law. Consequently, the challenge has been to apply these guide-
lines to new emerging employment arrangements, such as the growth 
of employee leasing.
The overriding common purpose of U.S. labor and employment laws 
for more than a century has been to protect the wage-earning worker 
hired by an employer. This means that virtually every employment-re-
lated statute includes an explicit defi nition of the terms “employee” and 
“employer” to determine the coverage of the statute and permit enforce-
ment.1 As a result, many of the issues related to a given statute can be 
resolved through reference to guidelines and precedents that have been 
in effect for decades.2 Unfortunately, the fact that each law has its own 
unique defi nitions and evolving case law, and the lack of generic defi ni-
tions that may be used interchangeably from one statute to another, can 
be quite confusing to employers. 
This confusion has caused some employers to think that contingent 
employment arrangements offer an easy escape from the obligations 
and constraints imposed by these laws, and thus a way to reduce la-
bor costs. With a few notable exceptions, however, this belief is falla-
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cious. Classifying people as independent contractors, placing people in 
temporary or part-time jobs, or retaining employees through a leasing 
company does not provide a “safe harbor” for employers.3 Employers 
should not assume that their legal liabilities are reduced because they 
hire contingent workers.4 
This chapter discusses the basic criteria and provisions of the ma-
jor workplace laws infl uencing controversial issues pertaining to the 
contingent worker. Most of the issues are not new, but rather refl ect 
the challenge of applying them in some new contexts and to a larger 
number of workers. The discussion focuses on the most critical and 
broadly applied legal interpretation issues embodied in the employ-
ment arrangements of independent contractors, temporary employees, 
and leased employees.5 The use of the common-law control test and 
the economic realities test in the interpretation of the laws is reviewed. 
The key issues then are discussed as they apply to the federal income 
tax, employment tax, and retirement benefi t laws; wage and hour rules 
(minimum wage); workers’ compensation; and equal employment op-
portunity laws. In closing, recommendations to improve public policy 
focused on contingent employment issues and questions for future re-
search are discussed. 
VARIATIONS IN TERMINOLOGY AND LEGAL TESTS 
The application of employment-related laws by employers to the 
contingent workforce is clouded by the lack of common or universal 
terminology used to identify the different types of workers or employ-
ers within federal statutes or across state statutes. Furthermore, there 
is confusion about applications of the legal tests used to interpret the 
meaning of “employee” and “employer” for each law. 
Variations in Terminology
Two variations are important to this discussion: the defi nition of 
an employee and the defi nition of an employer. For example, a person 
may clearly qualify as an independent contractor based on the defi nition 
of an employee in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or the National 
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Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rules, but be classifi ed as an employee 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and workers’ compensa-
tion laws. Thus, because of these differences, an attorney who is asked 
whether an individual qualifi es as an independent contractor can only 
respond, “Under what law?” 
One illustration of the confusing variety of terms for employers is 
the identifi cation of a temporary agency or employee leasing company.6 
These fi rms may be referred to as the leasing company, general em-
ployer, primary employer, labor broker, lessor, loaning employer, staff-
ing company, or contractor employer. Similarly, the employee placed 
by a temporary or leasing company may be referred to as a temporary 
employee, leased employee, borrowed employee (or servant), loaned 
employee (or servant), coemployee, or joint employee.
However, although these terms are similar, they are not necessar-
ily interchangeable due to differing technical defi nitions. Also, some 
laws regulate these categories but do not precisely distinguish them. For 
example, many employment statutes, such as FLSA and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity (EEO) laws, generally do not distinguish between 
leased employees and temporary employees per se. However, under 
other laws, such as worker compensation statutes, these categories are 
addressed with great specifi city.
This chapter will use the terminology commonly associated with 
the particular law being discussed. In some cases distinguishing fea-
tures will be noted, but every distinction cannot be articulated. 
Common-Law and Economic Realities Tests
Statutes, regulations, revenue rulings, and legal tests are used to 
interpret issues of worker status (for a more detailed discussion of these 
tests, see Muhl [2002]). The beginning point in analyzing the relation-
ship between a worker and a company is to determine whether the 
worker is an employee under a given statute. This question is critical 
because it determines the responsibilities of the employer for a variety 
of employment taxes in addition to pay and benefi ts. If a worker can 
be classifi ed as an independent contractor instead of an employee, the 
employer can reduce costs.7
Two similar legal tests, or a hybrid of the two tests, have been used 
by the courts to make this determination: the “common-law control 
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test” and the “economic realities” test.8 These tests ask multiple ques-
tions to evaluate all aspects of the employment situation, and the courts 
examine each fact pattern independently. Particular attention is paid to 
who has the right to control the work process, but all factors must be 
considered to determine the outcome. If the employer has this right, 
then the person controlled generally will be considered an employee. 
Consequently, it is the conditions of employment that are key in deter-
mining employee status, not the classifi cation of the workers assigned 
by the employer. 
These two legal tests vary in the breadth of the circumstances in-
vestigated. The common-law test is the most widely used in federal 
cases. It is based on the legal concept of agency in which the employee 
is given authority to act for the employer by the employer. This test 
generally uses 10 factors to determine who has the right to control the 
work process.9 
However, the IRS uses 20 factors to determine the presence or 
absence of control.10 Also, when presenting a case before the IRS or 
courts, taxpayers can introduce other factors beyond the 20 as persua-
sive evidence negating or establishing control. Moreover, some IRS 
agents use three types of evidence in determining a worker’s classifi ca-
tion: behavioral control, fi nancial control, and the relationship of the 
parties. The intent of the parties, industry custom, independent contrac-
tor agreements, and the provision of employee-type benefi ts are other 
factors which have been considered by courts.11 
If a company misclassifi es a worker as an independent contractor, 
the IRS will reclassify the independent contractor as an employee and 
impose taxes, interest, and penalties that can create large tax bills.12 In a 
typical reclassifi cation, the company may be assessed for income taxes 
that were not withheld and employment taxes; the employment tax li-
ability would include both the employer’s and employee’s share.
The economic realities test usually is applied where the purpose of 
the law is to protect or benefi t a worker who is fi nancially dependent 
on an employer. It focuses on the nature of the economic relationship 
between the employer and the worker. It uses six factors to determine 
whether a worker depends on the employer for ongoing employment 
and economic livelihood. Since this test has a broader focus than the 
common-law test, individuals are more likely to be classifi ed as em-
ployees by the court.13 
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The hybrid test also examines all of the circumstances affecting the 
employment relationship by combining elements from the common-
law and economic realities tests. It considers the economic realities 
particularly critical, but it also considers who has the right to control 
the work process.
These different tests have resulted in varying interpretations of who 
is an employee and who is an independent contractor across the spec-
trum of tax, labor, employment, and retirement benefi t laws. As a con-
sequence, a worker in the same job category can be either an employee 
or independent contractor, depending on the facts and circumstances.14 
For example, in Consolidated Flooring Services v. United States (1997), 
a holding company owned two companies in which workers were in-
stalling fl oor coverings. The workers in both companies were doing the 
same work but were classifi ed differently due to varying circumstances. 
One company, Monroe Schneider Associates (MSA), used union em-
ployees to install fl oor coverings while the other company, Consolidated 
Flooring Services (CFS), contracted with nonunion workers for instal-
lation services. The Court applied the common-law test to conclude that 
the CFS nonunion installers were independent contractors. The Court 
stated: “. . . where CFS did maintain some control . . . installers retained 
their independence with respect to the sequence, manner and skill with 
which jobs were completed. Installers bore the risk of profi t or loss on 
their jobs and controlled their own work force.”
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, EMPLOYMENT TAX, AND
RETIREMENT BENEFITS LAWS
Identifying a worker as an employee or independent contractor is 
critical for federal income tax, employment tax, and retirement benefi ts 
laws. The determination of employee or independent contractor clas-
sifi cation is made by examining statutes, regulations, revenue rulings, 
and case law. Once it is established that a worker is an employee, then 
full-time, part-time, temporary, or leased employee status must be as-
certained. The full- or part-time status of an employee generally will 
be decided by the number of hours worked. The arrangement with an 
outside company will determine whether the worker is a temporary or 
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leased employee instead of an employee of the company for which a 
worker performs services. The application of the test and the factors 
used to guide decisions are discussed below. 
Federal Income and Employment Tax
Employee or Independent Contractor
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and Federal Insurance 
Contribution Act (FICA) are employment taxes.15 Employers generally 
prefer to hire independent contractors when appropriate because it re-
duces both their administrative costs of collecting and paying federal 
income and employment taxes. In contrast, the IRS prefers to have 
workers classifi ed as employees so that it can collect the maximum 
amount of tax revenue. 
If the worker is an employee, the company as employer has the re-
sponsibility to withhold income and employment taxes (e.g., to pay for 
the Social Security and Medicare programs supported by FICA) from 
the compensation of the employee.16 The payment of one-half of the 
FICA tax with the accompanying fi ling and reporting obligations is a 
primary reason many companies attempt to classify a worker as an in-
dependent contractor. In addition, the employer must pay the FUTA tax, 
which covers the cost of administering the unemployment insurance 
system and the states’ Job Service programs, and provides 50 percent 
of the cost of extended unemployment benefi ts when unemployment is 
high.17
In contrast, payments to independent contractors are not subject to 
withholding of any taxes because the company is not considered an 
employer of this type of worker. Independent contractors therefore 
must pay the proper amount themselves in estimated quarterly income 
tax payments or be subject to penalties and interest.18 A negative con-
sequence for independent contractors is that they are not covered by 
unemployment insurance and are not entitled to these benefi ts if they 
become unemployed.19 Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 6, many part-
time employees are not eligible for FUTA coverage due to working too 
few hours.
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Coemployment
The determination of the “employer” who is liable for tax and em-
ployment law compliance can be particularly perplexing when a com-
pany is employing temporary workers provided by a temporary em-
ployment agency or leased workers provided by a leasing agency.20 The 
issue created by these arrangements is whether the worker can be an 
employee of both the employment agency and the client (customer) 
organization. This dual status where two or more parties both stand le-
gally as the employer of a single employee is “coemployment.”21 
In the typical one-to-one employment situation, the employer for 
whom the worker performs services is responsible for income tax with-
holding. However, in a coemployment situation in which another party 
has control over the payment of wages, then that party is considered to 
be the employer. For example, in a case involving the General Motors 
Corporation, the company was held not to be the employer for em-
ployment tax withholding purposes when it contracted with a foreign 
company to obtain design engineers (General Motors Corp. v. United 
States 1990). The court concluded that regardless of whether the auto 
company ultimately controlled each design engineer while on the job, 
the facts supported a fi nding that the foreign company was responsible 
for paying the wages of the design engineers. This court focused on 
which party had control over the payment of wages to determine which 
company was the employer and therefore responsible for the employ-
ment taxes. 
Retirement Benefi ts
A qualifi ed retirement plan offers attractive tax features to employ-
ers and employees. Generally, for federal tax purposes, an employer is 
allowed a deduction when an employee includes the amount in gross 
income; however, the employer receives an immediate deduction for 
contributions to qualifi ed retirement plans, even though employees do 
not have to include the amount of the contribution in gross income.22 
The tax consequences for the employee are deferred until the employee 
receives a distribution from the qualifi ed plan. Contributions main-
tained in a trust or other qualifi ed fund accumulate tax free, resulting in 
an accelerated accumulation of pension funds for employees.
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However, a qualifi ed plan must meet a strict set of statutory require-
ments. Generally, a qualifi ed retirement plan by its design and opera-
tion must satisfy standards requiring coverage of a minimum percent-
age of employees and not discriminate in favor of highly compensated 
employees in contributions or benefi ts.23 The defi nition of employee is 
critical in the qualifi ed plan arena.
Employee or Independent Contractor
A specifi c defi nition of “employee” for qualifi ed retirement plans 
is not contained in the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). The Supreme 
Court applied the common-law test in determining whether a worker 
was an employee for the purpose of a qualifi ed plan, but did not con-
clude that the common-law defi nition must apply in all employee ben-
efi t cases.24 
The continuation of the qualifi ed status of a retirement plan can be 
dependent on the proper classifi cation of workers. If workers who are 
actually employees but improperly classifi ed as independent contrac-
tors are excluded from a qualifi ed plan, then the minimum coverage or 
nondiscrimination standard could be violated, resulting in disqualifi ca-
tion of the plan. Similarly, the requirement that the plan should be for 
the exclusive benefi t of employees would be violated if an independent 
contractor was incorrectly classifi ed as an employee and included, and 
could cause disqualifi cation.25 Also, the qualifi ed status of the plan may 
be in jeopardy if a suffi cient number of part-time employees who have 
one year of service have not been allowed to join the plan.26 Even where 
the tax-qualifi ed status of a plan is not in jeopardy, the erroneously ex-
cluded part-time employee would be entitled to participate in the plan. 
This would require the employer to make any missed past contributions 
to the plan on behalf of such improperly excluded employees. 
Disqualifi cation of a qualifi ed retirement plan is viewed as the ulti-
mate penalty because of the severe tax consequences on the employer, 
plan participants, and the plan trust. The IRS has recognized the se-
verity of the plan disqualifi cation penalties and the need to encourage 
plan sponsors to correct defects by introducing a set of administrative 
programs that allow many defective plans to correct problems without 
disqualifi cation.27
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Leased Employees
Leasing employees may be an attractive option for companies that 
are concerned with the higher costs associated with full-time perma-
nent employees, such as the payment of retirement benefi ts. The U.S. 
Congress was apprehensive that some companies might attempt to re-
duce their retirement benefi t costs by hiring a large number of leased 
employees who would perform the same services as employees without 
being eligible to participate in the retirement plan. Congress therefore 
enacted strict statutory guidelines to provide leased employees with ad-
ditional qualifi ed retirement plan protection. The statutory guidelines 
require the leased individual to be treated as the recipient’s employee 
when verifying standards such as coverage and nondiscrimination if 
 1) the services are provided pursuant to an agreement between 
the recipient and any other person,
 2) the individual has performed services for the recipient . . . on 
a substantially full-time basis for a period of at least one year, 
and 
 3) such services are performed under primary direction or control 
by the recipient.28 
As a result, when using leased employees, the employer must track 
the number of employees in this category to ensure that the stated per-
centage of employees benefi t under the plan’s coverage and participa-
tion tests. If the company has too many leased employees who are not 
eligible solely due to their statuses, then the plan will be disqualifi ed for 
failing the coverage and participation standards. 
Coemployment 
Two frequently cited cases illustrate the challenges of determining 
who is the employer in a coemployment situation: Vizcaino v. Microsoft 
(1997) and Bronk v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, Inc. 
(1996). In both cases the workers brought their action under ERISA, but 
different outcomes resulted due to the differences in the interpretation 
of ERISA by the courts. In Vizcaino v. Microsoft the court ruled that 
workers were employees for the purposes of participation in a retire-
ment plan, while in Bronk the opposite conclusion was drawn.
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Microsoft had a practice of supplementing its regular employee pool 
with workers who were classifi ed as independent contractors or tempo-
rary agency employees. In some job categories the regular employees, 
independent contractors, and temporary agency employees were per-
forming the same work under the direction and control of Microsoft. 
The IRS, in an employment tax audit, made a determination that the 
independent contractors should have been classifi ed as employees. Mi-
crosoft responded to the IRS audit reclassifi cation by offering jobs to 
a small number of the independent contractors as regular employees. 
However, the majority of Microsoft’s independent contractors were 
given the choice of being fi red or converting to temporary agency em-
ployees. The temporary employment agency merely provided payroll 
services; the working relationship between new temporary employees 
and Microsoft remained substantially the same as before the IRS audit. 
Former independent contractors then fi led an action on behalf of 
workers who met the defi nition of employees under the common-law 
test but who were not allowed to participate in the retirement benefi t 
plan because Microsoft considered them independent contractors or 
employees of a temporary employment agency. The 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated: “Even if for some purposes a worker is considered an 
employee of the agency, that would not preclude his status of common 
law employee of Microsoft. The two are not mutually exclusive.”29 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Bronk reversed the earlier Dis-
trict Court’s holding that employers must include in pension plans leased 
employees who were considered by the IRS as “employees” based on 
the common-law test. The Court of Appeals held that the I.R.C. and 
Treasury regulations governing the tax qualifi cation of retirement plans 
did not implicitly modify ERISA to require employers to include in 
their retirement plans those leased employees who had been excluded 
from the plans because they were not “regular employees.” Moreover, 
the Court of Appeals reasoned that Congressional action would be re-
quired to modify the tax qualifi cation provisions of the Code to permit 
retirement plans under ERISA to require the inclusion of properly ex-
cluded leased employees. Thus, some uncertainty remains about how 
“employee” will be interpreted by the courts as evidenced by the in-
consistent decisions in Vizcaino (In re Vizcaino 9th Cir 1999), the lower 
court in Bronk v. Mountain State Telephone and Telegraph Inc. (1996), 
chapter5.indd   144 4/11/2008   11:38:32 AM
No Safe Harbor   145
and other cases Abraham v. Exxon Corp. (1996); Clark v. E.I. DuPont 
De Nemours and Co. (1997).   
FEDERAL WAGE-HOUR LAW: THE MINIMUM WAGE LAW
The FLSA is the primary federal wage- hour law.30 It imposes on 
covered employers a minimum wage, a requirement to pay overtime pay 
at time and one-half after 40 hours of work in a week to employees earn-
ing less than $24,000 a year, and child labor restrictions applicable to 
persons under 18 years of age. This law provides nearly universal cov-
erage for full-time and part-time employees with few exceptions other 
than independent contractors, white-collar exemptions, and trainees. 
Employee or Independent Contractor 
Historically, the DOL enforcement policy has carefully monitored 
and limited the use of independent contractor status because it creates 
a potential escape for employers from wage and overtime obligations.31 
Based on the infl uence of an early Supreme Court decision in Ruther-
ford Food Corp. v. McComb (1947a) the DOL has applied the economic 
realities test in deciding who qualifi es as an independent contractor be-
cause, as the Supreme Court cautioned, “there is . . . no defi nition that 
solves all problems to the limitations of the employer-employee rela-
tionship” (Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb 1947b). The economic 
realities test is strictly applied to achieve the purposes of the FLSA to 
ensure that workers are not deprived of protection due to an artifi ce of 
making a would-be employee into a contractor. 
The offi cial guiding principles applied by the Wage-Hour Division 
emphasize four factors in the Field Operations Handbook (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor 2003, p. 10b06).32 These and additional control factors, 
considered in combination with economic reality factors, resemble the 
approach used by the IRS discussed above (U.S. Department of Labor 
2003, p. 10b07). Interestingly, the wage-hour guidelines further advise 
that the method of compensation, the issuance of governmental licens-
es, the place where the work is performed, and the absence of a formal 
agreement are immaterial to the determination of contractor status. The 
chapter5.indd   145 4/11/2008   11:38:32 AM
146   Coens and Storrs
exclusion of these four factors may refl ect the fact that each can be eas-
ily manipulated by employers to create the artifi ce of an independent 
contractor status.33 
In cases with many factors suggesting an employment relationship, 
the outcomes can vary, as illustrated by two well-known cases from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals: Brock v. Superior Care (1988) and Herman v. 
Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Services (1998). In Brock v. Superior 
Care the U.S. Labor Department sought to classify nurses working for a 
nursing agency as “employees” under the FLSA to support the claims of 
the nurses for unpaid overtime compensation. Superior Care, a provider 
of temporary health care nurses to individual patients, nursing homes, 
and hospitals, contended that the nurses were independent contractors. 
The arguments employing six key factors from the economic realities 
test are summarized in Table 5.1.
In a two-to-one split decision in Brock, the 2nd Circuit U.S. Court 
of Appeals found that the nurses were employees under the FLSA, 
overruling the trial court’s decision. Noting the closeness of the case, 
the court found that the integral relationship between the work and the 
agency’s business, the lack of signifi cant investment, and no risk of loss 
required a fi nding of an employee. The court further gave weight to the 
fact that the agency retained “employees” doing work similar to the al-
leged contractor nurses. However, the dissenting judge opined that the 
weight of evidence favored an independent contractor determination.
In contrast, in Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Services 
(1998), where the facts of the case were not substantially different from 
Brock, the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals majority opinion ruled 
against the DOL in a split decision.34 The court found that drivers for 
Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Service, a courier delivery service, 
were independent contractors even though they performed work that 
was integral to the nature of the company. In determining that the in-
dividuals were contractors, the court relied on the same tests used in 
Brock.35
These two cases demonstrate that the legal tests do not lend them-
selves necessarily to consistent interpretation and application; even 
learned judges with the benefi t of extensive testimony and thousands of 
pages of documents cannot agree on the application of the independent 
contractor factors in the same case. Such uncertainty may encourage 
prudent employers to classify borderline cases as employees.
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Table 5.1  Key Factors in Arguments in Brock v. Superior Care
Key factors in 
economic realities 
test
Company arguments for 
independent contractor 
status for nurses
DOL arguments for 
employee status for 
nurses
Degree of control 
exercised by alleged 
employer
No control: nurses worked 
with little supervision; 
primarily interacted with 
patients
Nurses’ hours and notes 
were reviewed; worked 
subject to procedures in 
extensive manual and 
received some direction 
from physicians
Degree to which 
employee’s 
opportunity for profi t 
or loss is determined 
by alleged employer
Similar to independent 
contractor, some nurses 
paid fl at fee per visit
No opportunity for 
profi t and loss; nurses 





from a few days to a few 
months, depending on 
patient needs; not ongoing
Skill and initiative 
required
Highly skilled work 
requiring exercise of 
independent judgment and 
discretion and interactions 
with physicians and 
patients, similar to 
independent contractor
No indication that 







Permitted to work for other 
agencies and many did, not 
dependent on employer for 
livelihood
Some paid by the hour 
based on local labor 
market conditions; had 
on payroll some nurses 
doing similar work paid 
as “employees”
Performing core 
work of alleged 
employer
Work performed was 
integral to business
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Coemployment
Joint liability under the FLSA allows either party to be held account-
able for the full amount of liability. By making both the staffi ng con-
tractor and the client company responsible there is a greater likelihood 
that employees will be paid properly. Also, if one “employer” should go 
out of business, the other party is responsible for unpaid minimum and 
overtime wages. Furthermore, this avoids the legal complexities associ-
ated with determining which employer is responsible. Consequently, 
the DOL holds both temporary employment agencies and leasing com-
panies jointly liable with their customer companies for back wages and 
penalties. In theory, by making both employers liable, the client com-
pany may be more careful in choosing responsible staffi ng providers. 
Thus, although there are a variety of risks with coemployment, those 
under the FLSA are potentially the most expensive (Moldover 2005). 
The DOL provides this protection to employees by broadly defi ning 
coemployment status in its compliance guidelines. The regulation states 
that two or more employers may be deemed to be coemployers under 
any one of three circumstances:
 1) There is an arrangement between employers to share an em-
ployee’s services even with separate payrolls.
 2) One employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of 
the other employer or employers in relation to the employee.
 3) The employers are not completely disassociated with respect 
to the employment of a particular employee and may be 
deemed to share control of the employee, whether directly or 
indirectly.
Client companies using temporary or leased employees may think 
that the above defi nitions do not cover them because they do not hire 
or assign the employee, or discipline or discharge. However, the sec-
ond criterion extends employer status to them since they act indirectly 
in relationship to an employee. Typically, the client company pays the 
staffi ng company amounts that are based on the hours worked and the 
hourly wage and benefi t costs. The staffi ng company then acts directly 
in the interest of its client company with regard to the employment of 
individuals assigned to work at the client’s establishment. Also, the cli-
ent company typically “directly acts” through supervision of the tem-
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porary or leased employee in the performance of the day-to-day work. 
In many leasing and temporary arrangements, this may hold true even 
when the staffi ng company has a personnel administrator on the client’s 
premises to deal with attendance, payroll, disciplinary, and discharge 
issues. Accordingly, in conventional temporary staffi ng and leasing ar-
rangements, both the staffi ng company and client company are jointly 
responsible for FLSA compliance (see DOL 1969, 1975). 
The courts generally have been supportive of the DOL coemploy-
ment guidelines. For example, in a 1998 decision, Baystate Alternative 
Staffi ng v. Herman (1998), the 1st Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals found 
that a corporate staffi ng company and its offi cers were liable for unpaid 
overtime even though the client employer directed the workers in their 
day-to-day work. Similarly, in Hodgson v. Griffi n & Brand, Inc. (1973), 
the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals found that a fruit and vegetable 
company qualifi ed as a joint employer of farm workers who were sup-
plied by independent contractor crew leaders. 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS
 The goal of the workers’ compensation programs since their cre-
ation36 has been to maximize the social safety net provided for employ-
ees when they are injured or disabled in the course of their employment. 
The program covers the loss of wages and medical expenses resulting 
from these injuries and disabilities. Except in a few industries such as 
railroads, air carriers, shipping, and the federal government, workers’ 
compensation is provided through state laws.37
Workers’ compensation was developed as “no-fault” insurance de-
signed to address quickly the fi nancial effects of inevitable industrial 
accidents. The “exclusive remedy” doctrine grants employers immunity 
against personal injury lawsuits brought by employees for work-related 
injuries except in extremely narrow exceptions. In granting this immu-
nity, state legislatures require employers to participate in workers’ com-
pensation plans that cover virtually all work-related injuries regardless 
of whether the employee is full- or part-time. The basis of payment is the 
experience rating of each employer: the greater the number of claims, 
the more the employer pays. Overall, the workers’ compensation pro-
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gram is benefi cial to the employer because the dollar amount awarded 
for workers’ compensation claims is only a fraction of what would be 
awarded by a jury if the employee could sue the employer in a personal 
injury lawsuit. Moreover, the claims adjudication process in workers’ 
compensation largely alleviates much of the costs of litigation.
Employee or Independent Contractor
Because only employees are eligible for workers’ compensation 
coverage, there can be savings from employing “contractors” instead 
of employees, especially when an employer has an unfavorable injury 
rating. This situation may tempt employers to classify workers as inde-
pendent contractors. However, legislatures and workers’ compensation 
agencies have imposed stringent limitations on classifying employees 
as independent contractors to provide the broadest basis for coverage, 
so the outcome is nearly identical to that of the FLSA. 
The diffi culty for multistate employers and insurance carriers is that 
the economic realities tests used in these cases vary somewhat from 
state to state. For example, case law refers to a test that has been derived 
from various Michigan Supreme Court decisions over the years. This 
list identifi es eight issues: 
 1) What liability, if any, does the employer incur in the event of 
the termination of the relationship at will?
 2) Is the work being performed an integral part of the employer’s 
business which contributes to the accomplishment of a com-
mon objective?
 3) Is the position or job of such a nature that the employee depends 
upon the emolument for payment of his living expenses?
 4) Does the employee furnish his own equipment and materials?
 5) Does the individual seeking employment hold himself out to 
the public as one ready to and able to perform tasks of a given 
nature?
 6) Is the work or the undertaking in question customarily per-
formed by an individual as an independent contractor?
 7) Control, although abandoned as an exclusive criterion upon 
which the relationship can be determined, is a factor to be con-
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sidered along with payment of wages, maintenance of disci-
pline and the right to engage or discharge employees.
 8) Weight should be given to those factors which will most fa-
vorably effectuate the objectives of the statute (McKissic v. 
Bodine 1972).
The court cautioned that these issues “must be applied as a whole and 
on a basis of common sense” (McKissic v. Bodine 1972). 
Other states apply factors similar to the above list with many expan-
sive questions on control, not unlike the IRS 20-factor test. However, the 
lack of legislative activity on this issue seems to indicate that the courts 
are applying strict standards for independent contractors since a liberally 
construed test would open the fl oodgates for employee lawsuits. 
Typically, employers err on the side of caution and carry workers’ 
compensation insurance to cover any independent contractor who ul-
timately may be determined to be an employee. Absent willful decep-
tion on the part of the employer, the employer will be fully covered as 
though the contractor was an employee. However, the carrier or state 
agency often will have the right to seek retroactive premiums for any 
misclassifi ed individuals.
Coemployment Issues
For many decades workers’ compensation tribunals and state leg-
islatures have recognized the “borrowed servant” doctrine (see, for ex-
ample, West Publishing Co. [2002]). This doctrine recognizes that both 
the general employer (in this context, the temporary agency, leasing 
company, or staffi ng company) and special employer (the client compa-
ny) may be obligated to provide workers’ compensation benefi ts. This 
doctrine generally has been applied when one employer borrows an-
other’s employees or to specialty staffi ng companies, such as custodial 
fi rms, or employees that come with special equipment from the staffi ng 
company. However, it has not been consistently applied to temporary 
and leased employee arrangements. Because of the exclusive remedy 
provisions there have been inconsistencies in the interpretation of this 
doctrine for these two categories of workers. 
When an employer retains a temporary agency’s employee or en-
ters into an employee leasing contract, the working agreement provides 
chapter5.indd   151 4/11/2008   11:38:33 AM
152   Coens and Storrs
that the temporary agency or lessor company will handle all payroll 
and insurance matters and expressly includes the provision of workers’ 
compensation benefi ts. When the coemployment doctrine is applied to 
these arrangements, often the state statute requires or implies that both 
companies are legally obligated to ensure that workers’ compensation 
coverage is provided. Therefore, if the temporary agency should go out 
of business without providing this coverage, the employee can seek 
workers’ compensation benefi ts from the client company that directly 
supervised the employee in day-to-day work. This generally holds true 
even when the temporary agency has breached its contract by failing to 
provide workers’ compensation benefi ts. If the client company brings 
a lawsuit for breach of contract against the temporary agency, this will 
not alleviate any of its joint obligations in the workers’ compensation 
system.
However, the courts generally afford the client company immunity 
from lawsuits when workers’ compensation is provided by a temporary 
agency. For example, in Sorenson v. Colibri (1994), a Rhode Island 
case, an employee who was injured on the job collected workers’ com-
pensation benefi ts from the temporary agency’s policy and then fi led a 
lawsuit against the client employer for the same injuries under tort law. 
Even though the Rhode Island workers’ compensation law requires that 
the “general” employer (the temporary agency) must provide the work-
ers’ compensation coverage, it upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit, hold-
ing that the client company was immune from employee lawsuits. The 
court reasoned that extending immunity to the client company was an 
equitable result because it is presumed that the temporary agency had 
charged an hourly rate to the client company that was high enough to 
recover the cost of workers’ compensation premiums.38 In a minority of 
states, however, different decisions have been made, particularly in the 
context of leasing arrangements, which do not give exclusive remedy 
immunity to the client employer.39
Concern has been growing among associations concerned with 
workers’ compensation, such as the International Association of Indus-
trial Accident Boards and Commissions and the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners, about a relatively new challenge: the use 
of leasing arrangements by client employers to circumvent their experi-
ence ratings.40 For example, an industrial employer may experience a 
high injury rate, resulting in a large increase in the price of its work-
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ers’ compensation premiums. In response it could “terminate” all em-
ployees but continue to employ them through a leasing agency, thereby 
avoiding higher payments for its poor injury experience rating. In con-
trast, the leasing agency as a separate entity pays a neutral and lower 
rate for workers’ compensation premiums. Also, there may be deliber-
ate misrepresentations or concealments by the employer or its agents 
of the reported job duties of workers used for workers’ compensation 
underwriting and quarterly earning and payroll reports.41 Amendments 
to workers’ compensation statutes have attempted to create a basis for 
using the experience ratings of the client company when employees are 
leased.
FEDERAL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAWS
The challenge for EEO laws is to hold accountable those who are re-
sponsible for ensuring equal opportunity and to prevent discrimination 
in the workplace. Application of the EEO laws to the contingent worker 
raises issues similar to those raised under wage and benefi t laws.
This discussion focuses on the three major federal statutes: Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), and the 1990 Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). The Equal Pay Act (EPA) is part of the FLSA, 
so liability for equal pay violations generally follows other FLSA ap-
plications as discussed above.42 State fair employment practice or EEO 
laws usually follow to varying degrees the precedents set in the federal 
laws. 
In 1997 the EEOC assembled what had been a scattering of court 
decisions, segments of language from various statutes and regulations, 
and formal guidance letters into one document addressing the applica-
tions of Title VII, ADA, and ADEA to the contingent workforce. These 
enforcement guidelines were provided in an easy-to-follow format il-
lustrated with examples.43 Although not binding on the courts, the docu-
ment generally follows the weight of the case law, and may be given 
“due deference” by the courts. The EEOC focus on contingent work 
is not surprising in light of the patterns related to race and gender dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. The enforcement guidelines expressly note that the 
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employees of temporary employment agencies are disproportionately 
female and African American, while workers provided by contract staff-
ing fi rms are disproportionately male (U.S. EEOC 1997a, pp. 1–2).
Employee or Independent Contractor
Employers commonly use the independent contractor status as a 
defense against EEO claims made by individuals who work with little 
supervision and are paid on a commission or incentive basis. However, 
the EEOC has maintained a conservative posture in allowing employ-
ers to assert the independent contractor defense. The EEOC has its own 
unique list of 16 factors that are used to determine independent contrac-
tor status, but none of them are controlling. 44 The courts have liberally 
applied the hybrid test with varied outcomes, based on the facts of each 
situation.45 
Coemployment 
Like other employment law agencies, the EEOC has applied broadly 
the defi nition of employer to achieve the purposes of the laws for which 
it is responsible. In relationships between client companies and tempo-
rary agencies or employee leasing arrangements, the EEOC guidelines 
place great weight on whether one or both parties are in a position to 
control the outcome that is the subject of an alleged EEO infraction. For 
some infractions liability may extend to nonemployers. 
Customarily the temporary staffi ng agency hires the individual and 
pays her wages throughout her tenure with the client company. The 
client company supervises the employee, indirectly pays for her wages 
and benefi ts, and has the right to terminate the employee and ask the 
temporary provider to send another worker. Under these circumstances, 
the EEOC guidelines indicate that both the temporary staffi ng agency 
and the client company are “employers” under the civil rights laws 
(U.S. EEOC 1997, p. 10). In other variations, the gradations in control 
and lack of control by the respective parties may change the outcome. 
For example, although a staffi ng company provides landscaping em-
ployees that it trains and supervises, the client company also may le-
gally become an “employer” if it reserves the right to direct the workers 
to perform particular tasks or otherwise controls the specifi c manner of 
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performance (p. 11).46 In contrast, the guidelines indicate that in a leas-
ing arrangement in which the leasing fi rm merely provides services for 
wages and benefi ts administration, the leasing fi rm would not be con-
sidered to be the “employer” for the purposes of Title VII (p. 8). 
The EEOC broadly applies the coemployment doctrine even when 
one party more clearly seems at fault. For example, if a staffi ng fi rm 
providing nurses is asked to provide a “white nurse,” and the client fi rm 
says that it will only accept white nurses, the staffi ng fi rm nonetheless is 
liable. The fi rm making a discriminatory request also is liable if it meets 
the threshold size test for liability (U.S. EEOC 1997, pp. 18–19).47
In sexual harassment cases, liability is more closely related to fault. 
The guidelines provide an example of a temporary agency assigning 
a receptionist who then is sexually harassed at the work site by her 
supervisor. The supervisor is an employee of the client company. She 
complains to the temporary agency and the temporary agency advises 
the client company. The client company refuses to investigate and asks 
for another receptionist who is not “a troublemaker.” The temporary 
agency tells the employee that it cannot force the client to investigate 
and assigns another worker to the receptionist job. The guidelines con-
clude that, in this situation, both the temporary agency and the client are 
liable. The temporary agency failed to take adequate corrective action; 
it should have insisted that the client investigate and asserted that its 
workers have the right to work free from harassment. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The use of various types of contingent workers and the expansion 
in outsourcing to fi ll workforce gaps is predicted to continue in the fu-
ture (Society for Human Resource Management 2005). However, the 
complexity of laws, lack of clarity, and potential for adverse econom-
ic effects on employers using contingent workers will continue until 
changes are made. Public policy initiatives designed to reduce those 
compliance errors that occur despite the good faith efforts of employers 
and make compliance easier must be balanced against the objectives of 
the statutes to protect workers or provide benefi ts to as many workers as 
possible. Changes pursued jointly by the federal and state governments 
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should include agreements that create greater uniformity and consisten-
cy in the terminology, simplify and clarify the legal tests, and improve 
guidance for compliance. 
Greater Uniformity and Consistency in Terminology 
One of the major compliance challenges is the lack of a single defi -
nition of “employee” that can be used in all work-related laws. This 
challenge was recognized by the Dunlop Commission when it recom-
mended the adoption of one defi nition of “employee” and one defi nition 
of “employer” for all workplace laws (DOL 2004). This change would 
greatly simplify employer compliance, particularly for small and me-
dium-sized companies which, unlike large companies, cannot afford to 
retain legions of lawyers and consultants and employ staffs of dedicated 
experts in human resource departments. Furthermore, the cost of com-
pliance for large fi rms is substantial. An economic analysis detailing the 
time and costs associated with the absence of universal defi nitions, as 
well as inconsistent rules and practices, will provide useful insights into 
these employer costs. 
A comprehensive analysis of the compatibility of uniform terminol-
ogy and defi nitions for tax, employment, and retirement benefi ts laws 
is an important fi rst step. This analysis could help encourage federal 
and state agencies to reach agreement on the usage of common terms 
and begin to apply the laws with greater consistency. In some instances, 
however, this change in approach will require diligent support from leg-
islative bodies. 
Such initiatives have already begun in some areas of the law. The 
development of uniform model laws and practices has been urged or 
adopted by industry associations. For example, model legislation draft-
ed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has been 
designed to promote a common approach by state legislatures to the li-
censing of leased employees and to ensure the proper experience-rating 
of workers’ compensation premiums (Employee Leasing Registration 
Model Act 1997). To achieve optimal results in the interest of public 
policy, these cooperative efforts should be undertaken not only through 
the efforts of government, but with participation of the academicians, 
industry representatives, and technical professionals, such as lawyers.
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Simplify and Clarify the Legal Tests
At present each law has a unique defi nition of “employee” and is in-
terpreted by referring to lists of factors used to evaluate the facts of each 
situation. These legal tests have been developed over time by govern-
ment bodies or created by the courts. As a consequence the interpreta-
tions of many tax, employment, and benefi t laws are needlessly arcane, 
verbose, and perplexing.
Despite each law having its own particular guidelines, the factors 
used to evaluate the facts of each situation are remarkably similar. There-
fore it is feasible that careful analysis of cases can lead to the develop-
ment of a uniform test, or perhaps two or three types of uniform tests, 
to classify workers consistently in all work-related laws. It is likely that 
greater uniformity can be achieved without signifi cantly sacrifi cing the 
enforcement objective of minimizing the number of independent con-
tractors so the maximum number of employees is covered.
Provide Useful Compliance Guidelines
While it is evident that many employers struggle to understand their 
legal obligations when classifying workers and engaging in coemploy-
ment arrangements, governmental agencies have done little to help. 
Guidelines can be written in a user-friendly, “plain English” style with 
clear examples and illustrations that employers can easily understand 
for the various employment laws. An example of this approach is the 
EEOC’s enforcement guidance document (U.S. EEOC 1997). Although 
the agency enforces many different laws with unique legislative histo-
ries and lengthy tests, it has created a single document that presents the 
full range of contingent work issues with many helpful illustrations. 
Case-law authority, distinctions in the application of particular EEO 
laws, and clear explanations of principles in an easy-to-follow, ques-
tion-and-answer format are provided. More primers of this sort would 
be helpful to employers to demystify the legal enigmas of contingent 
employment arrangements. 
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Notes
Alvin Storrs is indebted to Matthew Rocky-Hawley, a student at Michigan State Uni-
versity Detroit College of Law, for his assistance with the research in this chapter. 
Although the topic of this chapter is legal in nature, its content is intended solely to 
facilitate the purpose of general information and learning. Nothing herein is intended to 
serve as legal advice relative to any specifi c or general legal question or problem. Legal 
advice should only be obtained through retained legal counsel who is fully informed of 
all of the particular facts and circumstances.
  1.  These include the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act (FUTA), Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA), Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), and state laws gov-
erning unemployment and workers’ compensation. Citations for the federal stat-
utes in the order listed are: 42 U.S.C. § 410(e); 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(4); 29 U.S.C. § 2611; 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6); and 29 U.S.C. § 
652(6). For an example of state unemployment and workers’ compensation laws, 
see Michigan compiled Code Laws §§ 421.42, 418.161(b).
 2.  The major exception is the legislation in employee benefi ts. The tax code amend-
ments in the 1980s and 1990s signifi cantly altered the arena of deferred ben-
efi ts.
 3.  In § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, Congress provided so-called safe harbor 
tests, which prevent the IRS from retroactively reclassifying an independent con-
tractor as an employee. This provision is extremely benefi cial because it provides 
retroactive relief for employment taxes, penalties, and interest. A company seek-
ing relief under § 530 must meet these requirements: have a reasonable basis for 
classifying a worker as an independent contractor; demonstrate consistent treat-
ment of the worker as independent contractor for periods beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1997; and fi le all required federal tax returns consistent with classifying 
the worker as independent contractor. Although the requirements appear to be 
straightforward, the interpretation has proven to be complex; only a relatively 
small number of businesses have qualifi ed for relief. 
There are, however, other methods available to mitigate or reduce poten-
tially onerous employment tax penalties and interest. For example, see I.R.C. § 
3509 which provides reduced employment tax liability for certain retroactive re-
classifi cations of workers. Form 1099 is a document used to report nonemployee 
compensation for independent contractors. If Form 1099 is fi led for workers, 
then the employer’s tax liability is 1.5 percent of wages for income tax withhold-
ing and 20 percent of employee’s share of Social Security taxes. If Form 1099 
is not fi led, the above 1.5 percent is increased to 3.0 percent and the above 20 
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percent to 40 percent. I.R.C. § 6205 allows a special interest-free adjustment for 
certain underpayments of FICA and income tax withholding. I.R.C. § 3402(d) 
provides for retroactive relief from the assessment of income tax liability if the 
employer can prove that the worker reported the income assessed on the Form 
1040 return. Also, in I.R.S. Notice 98-21, 1998-15 I.R.B. 14, the IRS classifi ca-
tion settlement program has been extended indefi nitely. This program is designed 
to resolve worker classifi cation issues as soon as possible in the administrative 
process. If a taxpayer satisfi es certain requirements then the taxpayer may pay a 
reduced employment tax liability.
 4.   For example, see the summary of the risks of leasing workers in Dunn and Berk-
ery (2005).
 5.  Part-time and seasonal employees are not discussed in depth. Contrary to popu-
lar belief, there is no universal or even prevailing defi nition of a part-time em-
ployee among the various labor, employment, and retirement benefi t laws. Many 
of these laws employ exact defi nitions determined by the number of hours in a 
year or in a week that can affect coverage, exemptions, and obligations. Con-
sequently, human resources, employee benefi ts, and attorney practitioners are 
cautioned to review carefully how employees are defi ned relative to the number 
of hours worked and full-time status in every labor, employment, and retirement 
benefi t law. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exempts from 
overtime certain seasonal employees connected with amusement industries (29.
U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)). Eligibility for coverage under statutes such as the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) often is defi ned in terms of a minimum threshold of a specifi c number 
of hours worked in a year or given time period. For example, ERISA requires 
a minimum threshold of 1,000 hours before existing law mandates that an em-
ployee cannot be excluded from participation in a retirement plan on the basis of 
hours worked. The FMLA does not apply to a worker who has worked less than 
1,250 hours during the 12-month period immediately preceding the commence-
ment of the leave.
  6.  Similarly, the fi rm contracting its services may be referred to as the lessee, lessee 
employer, special employer, secondary employer, client employer (or company), 
customer employer (or company), borrowing employer, or contracting employer. 
More recently, leasing companies have begun calling themselves professional 
employer organizations (PEOs) (BPI Communications 1999).
  7.  For example, in 1999 the U.S. Department of Labor alleged that Time Warner 
misclassifi ed as many as 1,000 of its 40,000 workers to reduce its employee 
benefi ts costs (Herman v. Time Warner, Inc. 1999). A similar case occurred with 
FedEx in California when it classifi ed drivers as independent contractors (Nicho-
las 2005).
  8.  The common-law test is used by the IRS and has been applied by the courts to 
the FICA, FUTA, ERISA, NLRA, and income tax withholding. The economic 
realities test has been applied by the courts to the FLSA and Equal Pay Act, Title 
VII, ADEA, ADA, and FMLA. The hybrid test has been applied by the courts to 
Title VII, ADEA, and ADA (Muhl 2002, p. 6).
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  9.  These 10 factors are 1) right to control, 2) type of business, 3) supervision, 4) 
skill level, 5) tools and materials, 6) continuing relationship, 7) method of pay-
ment, 8) integration, 9) intent, and 10) employment by more than one fi rm (Muhl 
2002, pp. 5–7).
 10.  The 20 factors are: 1) instructions; 2) integration; 3) right of discharge; 4) right 
to terminate; 5) services rendered personally; 6) hiring, supervising, and paying 
assistants; 7) training; 8) payment by hour, week, month; 9) payment of business 
and/or traveling expenses; 10) continuing relationship; 11) set hours of work; 
12) full time required; 13) working for more than one fi rm at a time; 14) making 
service available to general public; 15) furnishing of tools and materials; 16) do-
ing work on employer’s premises; 17) order of sequence set; 18) oral or written 
report; 19) signifi cant investment; and 20) realization of profi t or loss. See Rev. 
Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 for a description of each factor.
 11.  For example, see Illinois Tri-Seal Products, Inc. v. U.S. (1965); Bonney Motor 
Express Inc. v. U.S. (1962); In re Rasbury (1991); and Butts v. Comm’r (1993).
 12.  For example, see the following sections of the Internal Revenue Code: 1) § 
6651: The penalty for the failure to pay employment taxes has a maximum of 
25 percent, which is calculated at 0.5 percent of the unpaid tax each month. This 
code section also has a penalty for failure to fi le employment tax returns with a 
maximum of 25 percent, which is assessed at 5 percent per month; 2) § 6662: It 
imposes a penalty of 20 percent of the underpayment attributable to negligence; 
3) § 6663: If serious abuse is found there is a 75 percent penalty of underpayment 
due to fraud; 4) § 6656: A failure to deposit penalty can range from 2 percent to 
15 percent of the underpaid deposit. This penalty is imposed in addition to failure 
to pay the penalty; 5) § 6721: A penalty of $15 to $50 per return is charged for 
the failure to fi le the correct information return such as a W-2. The maximum 
penalty is $250,000 with a reduced maximum of $100,000 for small employers; 
6) § 6722: If an employer fails to provide timely W-2s to employees, a penalty of 
$50 per return may be assessed. The maximum penalty is $100,000.
 13.  The six factors are 1) integration, 2) investment in facilities, 3) right to control, 
4) risk, 5) skill, and 6) continuing relationship (Muhl 2002, pp. 6–9).
 14.  Artists – Compare Rev. Rul. 57-155, 1957-I C.B. 333 with Rev. Rul. 65-262, 
1965-2 C.B. 391; Loggers – Compare Rev. Rul. 71-273, 1971-1 C.B. 286 with 
Rev. Rul. 71-274, 1971-1 C.B. 287; Repairers – Compare Rev. Rul. 55-248, 
1955-1 C.B. 117 with Rev. Rul. 55-370, 1955-1 C.B. 122.
 15.  I.R.C. §§ 3301–3311 (FUTA); 3101–3128 (FICA).
 16.  The Social Security tax is imposed at a rate of 12.4 percent on a changing wage 
base, while the Medicare tax is 2.9 percent on all wages. These taxes are imposed 
half on the employer as an excise tax and half on the employee in the form of a 
withholding tax collected from the employee’s wages by the employer.
 17.  The FUTA tax is imposed solely on employers at a rate of 6.2 percent on the fi rst 
$7,000 of the employee’s wages. Generally, a credit is allowed against the FUTA 
tax for amounts paid into state unemployment funds. This credit cannot exceed 
5.4 percent of fi rst $7,000 of wages. If the maximum credit of 5.4 percent is al-
lowed, the FUTA tax rate after the credit is 0.8 percent. 
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 18.  Compensation paid to independent contractors is subject to the Self Employ-
ment Contributions Act (SECA) tax. The self-employed tax rate is 15.3 percent 
(I.R.C. §§ 1401–1403). The independent contractor pays an amount equal to the 
employee plus the employer portion of the FICA tax. In an attempt to mitigate a 
double tax burden, the independent contractor is allowed to deduct one-half of 
self-employment taxes as an adjustment to gross income and for SECA purpos-
es (I.R.C. §§ 164(f)(1); 1402(a)(12)). The same defi nition of employee used in 
FICA also applies for SECA to exclude individuals who are not subject to SECA 
tax (I.R.C. § 1402(d)). 
 19.  Two recent cases in Idaho illustrate that this classifi cation problem continues to 
create enforcement challenges. See the discussion of the problem of classifying 
workers at Excell Construction, Inc. (Idaho Supreme Court Reviews Test for 
Independent Contractor Status [2005]). 
 20.  A temporary employee is sometimes defi ned as one who is retained with an ex-
pectation of being employed for one year or less and who has worked for the 
current employer for less than one year. There are two categories of temporary 
employees: 1) employees of an organization in a “temporary” status with no 
expectation of continued employment and 2) employees who are hired, referred, 
and sometimes supervised in part by a temporary employment agency. See Hip-
ple (1998).
The terminology “leased workers” is somewhat new. However, the con-
cept of “borrowed servant”—when one employer borrows the employees of 
another—can be traced at least to the 1930s and the early years of workers’ 
compensation laws. An entire industry known as “employee leasing” emerged 
in the United States during the 1980s and early 1990s. Setting aside the various 
statutory defi nitions, in this discussion the term “leased employees” refers to 
employees who are hired, referred, assigned, and in some respects supervised by 
an outside fi rm (leasing agency) with an expectation of employment longer than 
one year, but the assignment can be indefi nite. Thus, a leased employee is differ-
ent from a temporary employee since the latter is assigned with the expectation 
of employment for one year or less.
 21.  It also may be referred to as “joint employment” or “dual employment.” 
 22.  I.R.C. § 404.
 23.  I.R.C. §§ 410(b) and 401(a)(4).
 24.  See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden (1992), where the court used 
only 12 factors in making the decision. See also Hensley v. Northwest Permanete 
P.C. (2001), in which it was determined that the plan administrator did not err 
when interpreting the undefi ned term “employee” in a pension plan by using the 
W-2 defi nition and not the common-law defi nition.
 25.  I.R.C. § 401(a)(2).
 26.  The defi nition of one year of service is a 12-month period during which an em-
ployee works at least 1,000 hours. I.R.C. § 410(a)(l)(a)(ii) & (3). Careful moni-
toring of hours worked is required to ensure that part-time employees expected 
to work less than 1,000 hours are included if they in fact work more than 1,000 
hours. 
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 27.   See Rev. Proc. 2003-44, 2003-C.B. where the administrative program is called 
the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS) and includes 
the following corrective programs: Self-Correction Program (SCP), Voluntary 
Correction Program (VCP), and the Audit Closing Agreement Program (Audit 
Cap).
 28.  I.R.C. §§ 414(n)(3)(a) and 414(n)(2). However, there is a statutory exception that 
provides that the recipient organization will not be required to include the leased 
employees for testing purposes if the leasing organization maintains a money 
purchase plan which meets certain requirements and no more than 20 percent of 
the non-highly-compensated employees of the recipient are leased. The money 
purchase plan must provide: 1) a minimum contribution of 10 percent of com-
pensation; 2) immediate participation in the plan; and 3) 100 percent vesting in 
benefi ts at all times (I.R.C. § 414(n)(5)). However, it is unusual for a leasing 
organization to maintain such a generous qualifi ed retirement plan. 
 29.  The protracted Vizcaino v. Microsoft litigation spawned appellate victories for 
independent contractors and Microsoft. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp. (1996, 
1997). Microsoft, as part of the settlement for the case, changed its worker clas-
sifi cation practices. This resulted in 3,000 of the litigants being hired as regular 
employees entitled to participate in the retirement plans. A similar case occurred 
in Massachusetts (Langone v. USCO Distribution Services, Inc. 2005). See Bar-
ran (2005).
 30.  The FLSA is enforced by the Wage-Hour Division of the U.S. Department of 
Labor. While state laws also regulate wages and hours and impose similar and 
additional obligations, this discussion is limited to the FLSA. The FLSA regula-
tions were revised to add income tests effective August 23, 2004. 1938 law, as 
amended (Fair Labor Standards Act 2003).
 31.  A recent example of a company misclassifying street sweepers in California as 
independent contractors is seen in Garces v. Cannon Pacifi c Services (October 4, 
2005) (Cole 2005). 
 32.  The four factors are 1) the extent to which the services in question are an inte-
gral part of the employer’s business, 2) the amount of the alleged contractor’s 
investment in facilities and equipment, 3) the alleged contractor’s opportunities 
for profi t and loss, and 4) the amount of initiative, judgment, or foresight in open 
market competition required for the success of the enterprise. 
 33.  The courts do not consider the wage-hour guidelines as controlling, although the 
weight of the case law is largely consistent with the guidelines. Some courts have 
amplifi ed the tests with factors such as the skill level of the alleged contractor 
and the contractor having other clients. For example, see Brock v. Superior Care, 
Inc. (1988). 
 34.  In a fi ve-page dissenting opinion, Judge King concluded that the workers were 
employees. The majority opinion, he said, erred in departing from a long line of 
cases followed in that circuit.
 35.  The fi ve tests used were 1) Control: Even though the individuals were required 
to wear uniforms and attend a special training session, the court found that they 
could control their own hours, days of work, and reject any delivery without re-
chapter5.indd   162 4/11/2008   11:38:36 AM
No Safe Harbor   163
taliation. 2) Opportunity for profi t and loss: Drivers were paid on a commission 
basis, but the majority opinion found that profi t and loss was nonetheless driven 
by worker’s ability to cut costs and understand the courier business. 3) Perma-
nency of relationship: The court observed that most of the drivers only worked 
for the company for a short period of time and were able to work for other com-
panies. No noncompete agreement was required. 4) Skill and initiative required: 
The court found that the drivers must determine the route, read MAPSCO, and 
choose alternate routes. The majority opinion further noted that these skills re-
quire the workers to use industry and effi ciency indicative of independence and 
nonemployee status. 5) Relative investment of the worker and alleged employer: 
The court found that the necessity of owning a vehicle, paying insurance, and 
buying a dolly, tarp, a two-way radio, pager, and a medical delivery bag consti-
tuted a substantial investment.
 36.  Wisconsin was the fi rst state to pass a comprehensive workers’ compensation 
law (1911), and Mississippi was the last state (1948) Guyton (1999). 
 37.  See Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA); 45 U.S.C. Section 5(1), et seq. 
(airline and railroad employees); Longshoreman’s and Harbor Worker’s Com-
pensation Act, 33 U.S.C. Section 901 et seq., and the Federal Employees’ Com-
pensation Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 8101 et seq. Unemployment compensation ben-
efi ts also are offered under state laws to complement workers’ compensation. 
However, the basic features of these state programs must comply with federal 
laws to be eligible for revenues and funding from the federal unemployment tax 
(FUTA).
 38.  Other state jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion in analogous cases. 
For example, a Florida court reached a similar conclusion. In Maxson Con-
struction Co. v. Welch (1998), an injured leased employee brought a tort action 
against the client company of his leasing company employer. The Florida Court 
of Appeals held that immunity would apply to the client employer even though 
Florida’s leasing statute made the leasing company responsible for paying work-
ers’ compensation premiums. As in the Rhode Island decision, the court justifi ed 
its decision pointing out that the client company indirectly paid workers’ com-
pensation premiums. Also see cases in California, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, Texas, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (Wedeck v. Unocal Corp. 
(1997); Jones v. Sheller-Globe Corp. (1992); Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. and Eng’g 
Co., Inc. (1977); Farrell v. Dearborn Mfg. Co. (1982); LaVallie v. Wire and Ca-
ble Co. (1992); Regalado v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. (1993); Gansch v. Nekoosa 
Papers, Inc. (1990)).
 39.   For example, an injured employee in North Dakota who was covered by the 
workers’ compensation policy of the leasing company that hired him brought 
a tort action against the client company. The North Dakota Supreme Court de-
clined to extend employer status and its accompanying immunity to both the 
leasing company and the client company. The court explained that the North 
Dakota workers’ compensation law relieves only “contributing employers,” even 
though the client company paid an hourly fee that “probably” covered the cost 
of workers’ compensation premiums. The court noted that allowing such indirect 
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payment to trigger immunity could extend immunity to most independent con-
tractors who indirectly recoup the costs of benefi ts from their clients (Cervantes 
v. Drayton Foods, L.L.C. 1998). A similar decision was rendered by the Ohio 
appellate court, which also held that such indirect payments were insuffi cient to 
extend immunity to the client company (Carr v. Central Printing Co. 1997). 
 40.  Telephone and personal interviews conducted by Thomas Coens with representa-
tives and members of these associations in several states and Washington, D.C. 
(March 1999–September 1999).
 41.  For examples of cases of judgments against client companies in workers’ com-
pensation cases, see West Publishing Company (2001, 2003) and Del Industrial, 
Inc. v. Texas (1998).
 42.  Equal Pay Act: 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1963). 
 43.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for the 
enforcement of Title VII, the ADA, ADEA, and EPA (EEOC 1997).
 44.  The 16 factors are 1) the fi rm or the client has the right to control when, where, 
and how the worker performs the job; 2) the work does not require a high level 
of skill or expertise; 3) the fi rm or the client rather than the worker furnishes the 
tools, materials, and equipment; 4) the work is performed on the premises of the 
fi rm or the client; 5) there is a continuing relationship between the worker and 
the fi rm or the client; 6) the fi rm or the client has the right to assign additional 
projects to the worker; 7) the fi rm or the client sets the hours of work and the du-
ration of the job; 8) the worker is paid by the hour, week, or month rather than for 
the agreed costs of performing a particular job; 9) the worker has no role in hiring 
and paying assistants; 10) the work performed by the worker is part of the regular 
business of the fi rm or the client; 11) the fi rm or the client is itself in business; 
12) the worker is not engaged in his or her own distinct occupation or business; 
13) the fi rm or the client provides the worker with benefi ts such as insurance, 
leave, or workers’ compensation; 14) the worker is considered an employee of 
the fi rm or the client for tax purposes, i.e., the entity withholds federal, state, and 
Social Security taxes; 15) the fi rm or the client can discharge the worker; and 
16) the worker and the fi rm or client believe that they are creating an employer-
employee relationship (U.S. EEOC 1997).
 45.  For example, see the following cases: Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of 
Tex. (1993); Jones v. Seko Messenger, Inc. (1997); and Lane v. David P. Jacobson 
& Co., LTD. (1995).
 46.  The EEOC’s position stems, in part, from an earlier case, Amarnare v. Merrill 
Lynch (1984). In this case an employee of a temporary agency sued for race 
and gender discrimination under Title VII when she was discharged from her 
temporary assignment and the client company refused to offer her a regular posi-
tion. The client company contended that there was no employer-employee rela-
tionship. The court found, however, that the client company was the employer 
because it controlled the plaintiff’s hours, workplace, and assignments; it super-
vised and trained her; and ultimately it “discharged” her.
 47.  The threshold for liability for the client fi rm is 15 employees for Title VII and 
ADA and 20 employees for the ADEA.
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